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BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT

DISCUSSED BY

MAJOR-GEN'L SIR REGINALD HOSKINS, K. C. B.,
C. M. G., D. S. O.

and

DR. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

With Remarks by

RT. HON. SIR WILLOUGHBY DICKINSON, K. B. E.
MR. BISHARA NAHAS HON. HENRY MORGENTHAU
MR. SYUD HOSSAIN MUFTY-ZADE K. ZIA BEY
MRS. MARGUERITE HARRISON

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SPEAKERS:

MAJ.-GEN'L SIR REGINALD HOSKINS, K. C. B.,
C. M. G., D. S. O.

Nile Expedition, 1897-99; 1915-19, with British Army in Egypt, serving with General Allenby; Commander British General Staff in Egypt, 1919-23; Retired, 1923.

DR. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Former European Correspondent, New York Herald; Author of Introduction to World Politics; Europe Since 1918; The New Map of Africa.

LEADING THE DISCUSSION:

RT. HON. SIR WILLOUGHBY H. DICKINSON, K. B. E.

Former Delegate from Great Britain to the League of Nations Assembly; Chairman of Committee on Minorities, League of Nations Union, England.

MR. JAMES G. McDONALD, Chairman

S P E A K E R S' T A B L E

Mufty-Zade K. Zia Bey	Mr. Huntington Gilchrist
Judge & Mrs. Pierre Crabites	Professor Richard Gottheil
Mr. John Crane	Sir Reginald & Lady Hoskins
Mr. John Langdon-Davies	Miss Freda Kirchwey
Sir Willoughby & Lady Dickinson	Mrs. Crane Leatherbee
Professor Edward Mead Earle	Dr. Robert Morss Lovett
Miss Gertrude Emerson	Mr. David Mitrany
Mr. Glenn Frank	Hon. Henry Morgenthau
Mr. & Mrs. Jackson Fleming	Mr. Bishara Nahas
Dr. & Mrs. Herbert A. Gibbons	Mr. Savel Zimand

Those who took part in the discussion were MR. BISHARA NAHAS, an Egyptian Merchant; HON. HENRY MORGENTHAU, former Ambassador to Turkey; MRS. MARGUERITE HARRISON, author and lecturer, who recently returned from a year in the Near East; MR. SYUD HOSSAIN, editor of the *New Orient*; and MUFTY-ZADE ZIA BEY, a Turkish merchant and author.

BRITISH POLICY IN EGYPT

MR. JAMES G. McDONALD, *Chairman*

BEFORE I introduce General Hoskins, I am going to try to do what I am told I must do, which is to give you the background of Egypt's history, some 7,000 years of it, in less than seven minutes.

I dispose of the period prior to the conquest by Alexander, the period of roughly four or five thousand years, made up of thirty dynasties, by saying that it is an extremely interesting period, but for us has only this significance, that as early as the sixth dynasty—about three thousand years before Christ—the Egyptians were extending their influence in what they then called Ethiopia, which is the present Northern Sudan.

The two following periods, that of the Romans down to the middle of the Seventh Century and, that of the Moslems down to the Turkish Conquest, need not concern us here. Of the Turkish period, 1517 to 1914, I stop first to remind you that Mehemet Ali, 1805-1849, was one of the makers of modern Egypt. He was important for three things: First, he loosened, almost to the breaking point, the ties between Egypt and Turkey; second, he began the development of cotton raising in Egypt; and third, he conquered the Sudan.

It will be generally agreed that after Mehemet Ali the most important Egyptian figure in the nineteenth century was Ismail, 1863-1879. He made a brilliant beginning; he effected many reforms and modernized Egypt until as he said it became "almost European." The greatest achievement of his reign was completion of the Suez Canal. Unfortunately his manifold projects combined with reckless personal extravagance brought him and his country into hopeless bankruptcy. In the end he was deposed by order of the Sultan. Just before his deposition his shares in the Suez Canal were purchased by Great Britain—one of the brilliant diplomatic achievements of Disraeli, later Lord Beaconsfield.

Egyptian bankruptcy led directly to foreign intervention which during the 1870's and the beginning of the 1880's took the following forms: First, the Mixed Tribunals which still continue, second, the Debt Commission representing French and British financiers, and third, the Dual Control which placed an Englishman in charge of revenue and a Frenchman in charge of expenditure. In 1882 occurred the revolt of Arabi, primarily against foreign influence. This was crushed by the British acting without the French who had refused to take part in a joint operation. The defeat of Arabi ended the Dual Control and gave Britain for the first time a lone hand in Egypt. It should be noted also that at this time Sir Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, came to Egypt. He remained there as British Chief Agent until 1907.

A year later after the crushing of the insurrection in the north, there occurred, in 1883, in the Sudan the revolt of the Mahdi. An Egyptian army of ten thousand men under an English officer, Colonel Hicks, sent against the rebels, was annihilated. In 1884-85 came the tragic incident of General Gordon. He had been in the Sudan for a number of years

and knew how to get on with the Sudanese admirably. He was asked by the British and Egyptian Governments to go to Khartum, and if possible to effect the retreat of the British and Egyptian troops, besieged there. Gordon went to Khartum. But being brilliant and daring rather than discreet he did not retreat. Instead he attempted to stand out against the Mahdi. As a result the city was taken and he with eleven thousand of his men were massacred, two days before the arrival of reinforcements.

Following this disaster Britain and Egypt for the next thirteen years practically withdrew from the Sudan. But in 1898 General Kitchener moving up the Nile finally defeated the forces of Mahdism at Omdurman. This victory led, however, to a very dangerous clash between the British and French at Fashoda. While Kitchener was advancing southward along the Nile, Captain Marchand, a French explorer with an indefinite commission from his government, was moving across Africa to the Upper Nile. He arrived at Fashoda a few weeks before Kitchener and raised the flag of his country above the town. For months it appeared not only probable but likely that war between France and Britain would ensue over the clash of interests there. France eventually withdrew and shortly afterwards arranged with Britain a delimitation of their respective spheres of influence which has remained substantially the basis of division between the two countries until now.

The victory of Kitchener, and the withdrawal of the French led to the establishment for the first time of the British position in the Sudan on a definite basis. The so-called "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" was to be governed by a sort of benevolent dictatorship. Sovereignty was to be exercised jointly by Britain and Egypt. A British Governor-General in command of Egyptian and British troops, with British officers in all except one of the Provinces was to administer the country. In the meantime, of course, Britain was acting as advisor to the ruler of Egypt. This anomalous situation was changed in 1914 by Britain's declaration that Egypt was no longer a part of the Turkish Empire and by the establishment definitely of a British Protectorate.

In 1922 Britain granted independence to Egypt, but reserved for later consideration four major points: Imperial communications, the Sudan, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, and the defense of Egypt. The most important of these for the purposes of today's discussion is the Sudan. A few weeks ago the British Commander in the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was murdered. The day of the funeral General Allenby delivered his ultimatum to the Egyptian government. Zaghlul Pasha resigned and the new ministry assented to the British terms.

I hope that this analysis has not been colored. I have given you this "A B C" of the background of Egypt's history not because I think you members of the Association do not know it already, but because some of your friends whom you have brought with you may need it!

We think we are particularly fortunate to have as our first speaker today a man who has lived in Egypt a great portion of his life, who has been intimately connected with the British army there, and who, therefore, can give us a sense of the situation in Egypt which it would be difficult for anyone without his experience to give. Major-General Sir Reginald Hoskins was with the Nile Expedition in 1897 to 1899, and

again in Egypt from 1915 to 1919 with the British army, serving with General Allenby. He was Commander of the British General Staff in Egypt from 1919 to 1923, and he retired from the army last year.

General Hoskins is not, he tells me, an orator, and I am glad that he isn't. He is not speaking on behalf of the British government, and he is not speaking—primarily, at least—as a person acquainted with political situations; rather he is speaking as an individual, as a former soldier who will give us as best he may in twenty or twenty-five minutes his impressions of the situation in Egypt today: General Hoskins. (Applause.)

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR REGINALD HOSKINS

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is quite right, I am not an orator, but I said I would come here and speak quite frankly as a soldier about some of the things that I know of the countries which you are considering today. I rather demurred when the Secretary of this Association approached me. I thought I couldn't fill the bill, but she is very hard to resist and I said I would come and just make a frank talk.

I have been in those countries for the greater part of my life, the part of my life that I have enjoyed most, I think. I know the people of Egypt well and the people of the Sudan very well. I have very good friends among the Egyptians and among the Sudanese, and among the Arabs, and the only thing that I really have at heart is the happiness of those peoples.

The history has been extraordinarily well and succinctly put by your Chairman. That saves me from trying to do what I thought I might have to do, a good deal of preliminary history work. But in an audience of this kind, in a continent far away from Africa, it is only to be supposed that a great many of you don't know clearly what sort of country and what sort of peoples we are talking about, and so I will try to make a little atmosphere. I will, so to speak, throw the ball in for the debate by telling you something about the country and the people.

The country of Egypt is, you may say, just the Nile and the Suez Canal. The Nile is a river that comes from Uganda, as you will see from your maps,* Uganda being a British Protectorate which uses the water of the Nile. It runs through the Sudan into Egypt and at Cairo breaks into several channels, forming the Delta of the Nile, one of the most valuable agricultural districts in the world. Without the Nile, Egypt would not exist. Her people, generally speaking (about ninety per cent of them) are fellahin—peasantry living on the waters of the Nile—clinging to its banks, busy all day in the fields, and they have been living so for generations back.

The rest (perhaps ten per cent) of the people are very largely the Turks and those who came in with the Turks in the time of Mehemet Ali, and a great number of Europeans who have been attracted to that country and have engaged in commerce of various types, great and small, and also some professional men, and in the wake of those Europeans came a great many Levantine rapsallions of all sorts trying to get a living, not always honestly.

Now, those ninety per cent of the people of Egypt that we spoke about, the fellahin, are illiterate. They go out to the fields in the morning and they come back in the evening, and it is very important to remember that when you are considering a political problem, because the minds of people of

*See map on page 31.

that sort are very different from the minds of literate people who read for themselves and think for themselves.

The Suez Canal, which doesn't bother Egypt very much, is of the greatest importance to the British Empire. It is a link in her communications which is so important that she cannot permit any anarchy or any serious disturbances to take place in a country in close proximity to it. So, as your Chairman was telling you just now, when there was a revolt under Arabi in Egypt, when we asked France, Italy and Turkey to join us in putting down that revolt, and they would not do it, we had to do it ourselves, and we did do it, and that was what started us in the occupation of Egypt which has been going on until now.

Under Lord Cromer, the prosperity of the country grew enormously. The administrators whom he put in were almost without exception successful to a greater or lesser degree, and out of bankruptcy a fine and prosperous country has been made. This has been made possible only by the British occupation.

During the Great War, we had to make up our minds that the political position of Egypt had to be clarified. We could have annexed it perhaps. We could have done that many times, but we never wanted to; it wasn't our intention and it wasn't our policy to do that. We said that we would go out when she could govern herself, and that is what we adhere to still.

During the war, as I say, we could have annexed Egypt. We could have said to Egypt—and the Egyptians probably would have done it—"make some act of aggression as against Turkey," and she would have been committed then on the side of the Allies; but we thought it better—at least for the purposes of the war—to declare a Protectorate. When we did that, we told the people of Egypt that we were going to run the war ourselves and we weren't going to call upon them for any help. As a matter of fact, they helped very willingly in such things as labor corps, camel transport corps, and many other auxiliary services which were very, very useful; in fact, I hardly know what we should have done without them in Palestine.

However, while that was going on, the young inspectors that we have in all the provinces of Egypt came and said, "We want to go and join a regiment. We don't want to stay here." When young fellows insist like that, unfortunately people give in, and those young men who used to be the great friends of the fellahin were allowed to go and join regular regiments, and the result was that the fellahin, or peasantry of Egypt, were left at the tender mercies of sheiks and omdehs in the villages who brought about the same sort of regime that used to be there before we went into the country. That is to say, that when the sheik or omdeh wanted to do anything or was told to do anything, he did it harshly and then he said, "It is the British who told me to do it."

The Nationalist Party, which had been strong and growing stronger, took full advantage of the war, and when they saw this sort of thing going on, one can imagine how easy it was for them to get hold of these simple fellahin, tell them what brutes these British were who were allowing all this to go on, and so work on the feelings of these illiterate peasants that they joined, in a sort of way, the Nationalist Party. It was, of course, most unfortunate that we ever took those young inspectors away.

I must admit there were many ways in which the British could have improved the conduct of the war, so far as the Egyptians were concerned, had they thought of it; but in the war, if you will look back, there were so many considerations that were purely military that some of the civil considerations got rather overlooked, and so the Nationalist Party found a very easy field on which to work among the more ignorant of the Egyptians. They took full advantage of it.

Among the more enlightened Egyptians one might think that they might have had more difficulty, but it is the nature of the Egyptian, I think, to intrigue. Politics, especially politics in a coffee-house, he loves, and that is the place where this party has very largely grown in numbers anyhow, if not in weight. We, in our system of education, taught to become young government officials dozens of times more men than there were ever likely to be places for them to go into, so that there were certain Egyptians of the middle class who had a smattering of education—the sort of education that made it possible for him to read and understand any newspapers that might be about and to talk with some fluency about it all in the coffee-houses; and when those young men saw that there was no place for them and that a great many of the places were filled by the British, they very naturally said, “I am just as good as that fellow; why shouldn’t I have that job? What is the good of the British staying here any longer? Let us run the country ourselves.” That is easily understood.

At the end of the war, that being the situation in Egypt, there was a great alarm in the Mohammedan world as to what was going to happen about the Caliphate, that is to say, the head of the Mohammedan community, seeing that Turkey had been beaten in the war.

This was taken up with a good deal of eagerness in Cairo generally and in particular at their Mohammedan University, el-Azhar. It was a flame which grew and spread broadcast over Egypt just after the war. This made a situation of such unrest in Egypt, all those things combined, that you can imagine what they felt when there fell among all the tired peoples of the world that blessed word “self-determination.” They said, “Here is the very thing,” and they asked for their delegates to be received at the Conference at Paris and in London. Then (I think, very unwisely) we not only didn’t assist them there, but we said they couldn’t go, or be heard if they did go.

Well, now, when they got back to Egypt there was another trouble, there was another fire, and I think that is really largely responsible for the present state of affairs. So we sent a commission under Lord Milner, and the members of that commission were men of the greatest experience, and the class of men of character and temperament who would get on with—and most of them did know well—the leading Egyptians. It took them a long time before they could get the statesmen of Egypt to come and talk to them, but eventually they did. The result of their inquiry was to advise the British Government to give independence to Egypt with certain reservations, and those reservations were that the question of the Canal and the Sudan were things that we reserved to ourselves for discussion with Egypt, and that as far as defending Egypt against any foreign aggression from outside, we would look to that, and that as far as looking after the interests and the properties and the lives of nationals of foreign countries in Egypt, we would look after that, too. So when that Treaty of

Independence was made, it was part and parcel of the Treaty that those matters should be discussed as soon as possible between Great Britain and Egypt, and that decisions should be come to on those four questions in a spirit of mutual accommodation.

Great Britain was ready to meet and treat with the Egyptian representatives at any time they desired, but Egypt has not seen fit to come forward and discuss the matter. Tentatively she has sent one or two men who have always said, "We have got to have the Sudan. You mustn't stay in the country. We will have nothing to do with your control of the Canal."

In fact, they want entire independence without any of those reservations, and we said that without those reservations the treaty wouldn't stand. At the same time that we did that, we told all the powers of the world that we considered our relations with Egypt a domestic question and that, in fact, we should resent any interference from any other power, and that was perfectly clearly stated at the time. But the Egyptians thought that if they hammered on, they would get their independence and they would be able to snap their fingers at these four reservations. They thought if they could keep on agitating long enough they would win, and so the agitation has been growing. This Nationalist Party has been led by a few very extreme Nationalists, who were stronger than the rest and more obtrusive, and they have worked up the rest of their party. They have ramifications all over Egypt and in the Sudan, and their one ambition is to make everything difficult for Great Britain, and they will stop at nothing.

The other day, you will remember, they assassinated General Stack, the Governor-General of the Sudan—just a cold-blooded murder in the street. There is a position of the greatest gravity. I knew him well. He was a great friend of mine for thirty years. He was a man of the most charming character; never did anybody any harm; the most lovable of men. He never had an enemy there, I am perfectly sure, so it is not he, but just the office; it is just Great Britain that they are aiming at, and that is the situation, and that is the moment that they choose to appeal to the League of Nations.

Now, suppose the Philippine situation were a little more analagous than it is—it is fairly so—suppose that, and suppose there was a Panama Canal question mixed up with that at the same time, and suppose, we will say, General Leonard Wood were assassinated by the Filipinos, would that be a moment to treat of that question with the League of Nations? No, of course it wouldn't be.

Luckily we have got a man there; we have got Lord Allenby, and he dealt with that situation quite firmly, but by no means harshly, and so long as he is there, I have great hopes that things will straighten out. Much more danger is likely to come from men far cleverer than Lord Allenby, perhaps, but who are at a distance and don't see things so clearly as he does, and perhaps haven't got the same high character and frankness and clearness of outlook that he has.

Now, the Sudan is absolutely a different question. Just lately it has become badly mixed up in the Egyptian matter, but it is an absolutely distinct question. We heard that Egypt used to govern the Sudan. She practically never has governed it. For any sort of government you have to go and look back to some indistinct history of the Pharaohs. When Mehemet Ali sent people there, it was no good government, no administration, so

the country became a hopeless, corrupt, slave-trading, black spot of Africa, and we had to get them out. If they go there again, alone, somebody will have to get them out again. I don't believe for a moment that the Arabs or the Sudanese will admit of Egypt's governing it alone. Anyhow, we don't mean that they shall try. We have gone there. We have spent perhaps no more money than Egypt has, perhaps no more lives, but anyhow, we have produced the administration that has made the Sudan prosperous. We have got it there, and it is for the good of the Arabs and the Sudanese that it shall stay there until they can govern themselves.

We were quite right to make a condominium with Egypt when we took the Sudan together with her, and as far as she can come and take her hand in that government, let her come, but while she sends no one but these young students into the small offices of the government to give trouble, to work against the British, then she had better stay out. Nobody hears anything from Egypt about self-determination for the Sudan. There is not an Egyptian native in it. They are either Arabs or Sudanese, not Egyptians. It is not their country.

Well, that is just how I feel about it, ladies and gentlemen. (Applause.)

I don't for a moment want to queer the pitch for anybody, but I just want to tell you frankly what my feeling is, and I am sure it is like that of all other Englishmen and a great many other Europeans who have lived some time in Egypt; they would agree with me almost throughout. It isn't just my opinion. It is the opinion of most of the people like me, and all I would say to you is not to listen to those, of whom there are a great many, who will go around government waste paper baskets or go around listening to the small politics of the coffee-houses; don't listen to that. Try to get the picture in your mind firmly yourself, until you feel yourself forced to certain conclusions and I believe they will be mine. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are all debtors to General Hoskins for the frankness and directness with which he has put what he probably rightly calls a typical British point of view.

Now, the next speaker is an old friend of ours. You all know Dr. Gibbons. You all know about his books, some of which I would recommend to you; one of which I would distinctly not recommend to you. It isn't his book on Africa. It is another book in which he discusses American policies. He knows much more, I think personally, about Europe than he does about what American foreign policy should be. (Laughter.) We usually prefer to have him speak on these things about which he knows most.

Now, it happens that Egypt is one of these. He has been in the Near East, as you know, a great deal. He has been closely associated with many people in Egypt. He was, I know, a personal friend of the assassinated British Governor-General, and he has been personally associated closely with many of the Egyptian Nationalists. So, I am sure we look forward with keen interest to see how much he will tell us of what he thinks in his twenty-five minutes. (Applause.)

DR. HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

MR. CHAIRMAN, ladies and gentlemen: I was fascinated by the talk that General Hoskins has just given. It is, as our Chairman has rightly said, and as the general himself has claimed, the point of view not only of himself, but also of many men, perhaps of most of those who

have given their lives to building up British power in Africa. It is the point of view of most of the foreign residents, I know, who are at the present time and who have been for many years in Egypt. These men have not been to the coffee-houses. They have never sat down at table with the natives and have never heard or listened sympathetically to their point of view.

In my work in the Near East, I have always endeavored (not always with success, I will confess) to maintain the objective point of view. I have tried to look at these different great questions in their bearing upon world conditions. I have been in dissent from the point of view in regard to our entry into the League of Nations, so dear to the heart of our Chairman and to a great many of the members of the Foreign Policy Association.

Perhaps I have been too objective in what I have set forth as to American policies in the past and in the present, and my prophecies have been too realistic, I presume, concerning the trend that those policies are likely to take in the future.

In the Egyptian question I feel that our speaker who has just finished has made a fair presentation of what we have come to call in the last ten years the "Uebermensch," the superman, theory. It is the point of view generally adopted by the white race in connection with Africans and Asiatics. It is the point of view particularly of the English-speaking peoples, and among the English-speaking peoples of a certain group that we find in high places in Great Britain and in the former German Empire.

In the year 1914 I heard Herr von Mach, who had been for a long time the administrator of the Polish districts of Prussia (it was he who had attempted that famous, or infamous, or nefarious colonization project), talk about the Poles and their capacity for self-government. He gave a brief sketch of the history of Poland. Let me say that his presentation of the situation in regard to Poland was almost word for word and paragraph for paragraph the presentation that we have heard of the situation of the Egyptians, and it might hold, I fear, as General Hoskins' views regarding any people of Asia or Africa.

We go over these points one by one. Of course, first of all, that ninety per cent of the people are illiterate; second, that the protecting power which comes in to dominate has given them great material blessings; and third, that they are not in a position to govern themselves, but when they are, of course, they will have all the rights of self-government given to them.

I heard virtually the same kind of an interpretation of the situation in Eastern Europe at Christmas-time in the year 1914, the first year of the war, sitting in the Ball Platz in Vienna and talking to the famous Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austro-Hungary, who wrote the ultimatum to Serbia. He went back into the past history of the Serbians. He asked me if I was aware of the fact that more than ninety per cent of these people were ignorant peasants who couldn't read or write, that a little coterie of politicians had taken them in hand, that they had been attempting to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He dilated upon the virtues, of course, of the Archduke and of his wife and the horror of the assassination that had taken place in Bosnia. He spoke of the ineradicable differences that separated the various Serbian peoples. He maintained that from Vienna they could be ruled far better than they ever could be ruled from Belgrade.

He predicted what has happened, the arising of the peasant party under Radich and the confusion that would result, and he said, "Is the world going to be plunged into a war, swept away by cheap sentimentality or idealism on this false doctrine of self-determination?" and then he went and pulled out of a pigeon-hole a series of papers in which he showed me the tremendous benefits that had come to Bosnia and Herzegovina in over thirty years of the rule of the Austrians.

They had built railways there. They had increased the deposits in the savings banks exactly as the Germans had increased by 500 per cent in a certain length of time the deposits in Posnania and also in Alsace-Lorraine; and his argument was that these people had material blessings that were bestowed upon them from the fact that they were being ruled by a superior race, and, therefore, why should they worry? And he was very, very sorry over the fact that this great crisis in world history had arisen through the coffee-house agitation of certain "obtrusive" (I use the General's adjective)—obtrusive politicians whom we have known here in this country and whom we have honored in the course of the past fifteen years as heroes—Pasitch, Benes, Masaryk—you know who I mean!

I want to say right here in the beginning, in reference to this Egyptian situation, that I am on record in my books in full praise of the British Administration in Egypt and in the Sudan and of the type of men who have been responsible for the great material blessings that have come to Egypt and the Sudan in the course of the British occupation. I think from our Western, Occidental point of view, it has been a blessing to the Egyptians and the Sudanese alike to have had this long period of British rule. I believe that the men who have been responsible for the government there, men like our speaker today, have sincerely invested their lives in what was, from their point of view, a very great work for world civilization and something that would help and strengthen also the British Empire as an agency for civilization. And so there is nothing at all that is unfriendly in what I have to say today concerning the British in Egypt. I have broken bread with them, in Egypt and in the Sudan. Many of these men are my personal friends. What I am saying today is something that has a significance which is far beyond the acts of any one people like the British whom we love so dearly, or any set of administrators such as those who have so wisely and beneficently ruled over Egypt and the Sudan, and who have given a great measure of prosperity to those countries.

In the course of the last fifteen years there have come into the world new influences. There has come into the world a great yearning for world peace. The League of Nations, the World Court and all these various manifestations like the Geneva Protocol are proofs of our desire to attain a world-wide *status quo* that will make us in the future not so much fighting people as we have been in the past.

I firmly believe that the only way we can do this is to live and let live and to consider that other peoples, no matter how illiterate they may be and no matter how separated they may be from us in civilization and in religion, are only different from us; because they are different from us, they are not necessarily inferior to us. (Applause.)

I believe also that we have to realize, in connection with all the Asiatic and African peoples, that they must have a full opportunity, no matter how

badly they may fare themselves as a result of having had that opportunity, to work out their own salvation toward self-government.

If men like General Hoskins have been able to accomplish so much in Egypt and the Sudan, it is because they have behind them, as we in America have, hundreds of years of political and social evolution. There was a time when we were ninety per cent illiterate or more than that. There was a time when we were fighting against one another in Wessex, and Sussex, and Essex. There was a time when Scotland and England were going through centuries of border raids. Out of all that confusion, out of all that anarchy, through that period of testing that extended over hundreds of years, came the ability to become self-governing peoples.

I think that it is not fair or just for us to be the ones to gauge the arrival of the time for Oriental peoples to be fit for self-government, they having had none of the opportunity that we have had of evolution. How can they by some magic have arrived suddenly at a time when they can create an atmosphere and the machinery of an Occidental civilization such as we would approve of in their country, presto! with never a period of experimenting, of testing, of making mistakes and learning to correct them—as we had?

I have a son, and I know that I have been through certain experiences in my life that would be very helpful for him if he would follow me and allow me to direct him and guide him. I have been through the adolescent period and storm. I have been through the experiences that a man has at college. I have had difficulties of adjustment, even with the best of women, in the earliest years of my married life. I once made a perfect hash of my financial affairs, as almost every other young man has done. I wasted years of my life in going from pillar to post and not accomplishing much, and how much I would have been saved if I had only taken the guidance of my wise father during that period!

Of course, when my son goes out from the home, I could adopt the argument that is adopted in regard to Egypt and all these peoples, and I could say, "Now, my boy, I have experience." (I wouldn't tell him how I had gained it. I would not take that into consideration.) "I know better what is good for you than you know for yourself. I can run your financial affairs. I can run the affairs of your heart with the various girls that are going to make assaults upon you better than you can do yourself. I can start you in business. I can give you all kinds of advice whether you go into business or a profession. Look at me, with my white hair, approaching the age, pretty soon, of fifty, with all of these years of experiences I have had behind me. You follow me!"

I would maintain (and this is the argument and analogy I want to make in regard to all these peoples, Egyptians and others) that that boy, if I lived to be seventy-five and he attained the age of fifty, when he arrived at fifty, under such a tutelage, wouldn't be worth a tinker's dam. He would be worth no more than when he was twenty.

In regard to this whole Egyptian question, when it comes to this matter of self-government, the right of self-determination, I believe that the Egyptians, if left to themselves—and they are going to be left to themselves—are going to make a hash of affairs for a long period of time. The Egyptians are not supermen, as we think we ourselves are. But perhaps they can become as we are, if they go through the same period of experimenting

and have the same chance that we did of working out their own salvation—and I think that of every nation upon the face of the earth. Has not God given us all immortal souls and has He not endowed others with faculties and qualities like unto those that we have? Their handicap is not in an essential inferiority to us, but only in that they have not had behind them the same period of training and opportunity as European peoples.

Having disposed of that point, I will speak secondly of the question of material blessing in Egypt. I do not believe that any one else can bestow upon other people material blessings and guide them in those material blessings and give them gifts and create among them a feeling and spirit of happiness and well-being. No father was able to do that with his own children. He couldn't simply hand them out things. He couldn't say, "Now look here; let me run things and you are going to be better off," and expect to have those children of his leading happy lives. People have pride. What we Occidentals don't realize about the Orientals is that they are just as proud as we are, perhaps even prouder. They have got to have a chance to run things themselves, and above all, they have that inherent right.

That brings us to the point as to whether in this question of Egypt, and the question of all these Oriental nations, we are going to continue to have two moralities—one morality for Europe and America, and another morality for Africa and for Asia. This is one of those significant questions where we have to make the choice.

Now I want to go back a little bit into the question of Egypt and to develop it from another point of view, filling in some of the points that have been left out in the two previous sketches of the situation that has developed in Egypt. When the British went into Egypt, they declared that they were only going in there temporarily. The situation ever since that "temporary" entrance into Egypt reminds me of a friend of mine whom I knew in Paris back in student days. He was an artist, and after a great many years his father got tired of having him a remittance man and wanted him to come home and show him some of the pictures he had painted. When we heard about his leaving, as is always the case over there, there were certain obligations and debts that hadn't been acquitted one with another in the Quarter, and one of my friends went to Bob and said, "Bob, look here! I hate to speak to you about it" (he was very much embarrassed—why is it we are always so embarrassed when we ask people to return the money we have loaned them?) "I wish you would return to me before you go home that little sum, don't you know."

Bob was very much impressed with the fact that his friend was embarrassed, and he put his hand on his shoulder to reassure him and said, "Look here, old man, don't you worry about that. Whenever you feel like asking me for that money, you go ahead and do it." (Laughter.)

It has been like that with British statesmen ever since their first entry into Egypt. They made definite pledges not only to the Egyptian people but to other nations that their entry into Egypt (a country that was not a domestic concern of the British Empire alone but which is something that affects the whole world's prosperity and well-being) was only for a brief period and they were going to get out. Gladstone said very, very clearly, time and again (you can see it in the Hansard reports of Parliamentary debates) that it would be a shame and a disgrace if Great Britain

were to go back on her word and remain indefinitely in Egypt. Over and over again that has been said. Yet during that time, because of Egypt's growing importance in the British Empire, it seemed a wise thing to continue to stay in Egypt and go back to the reconquest of the Sudan and to the organization of those territories. It is the old policy of imperialism that has been followed by so many nations, and excuses were found always that, "Well, we will get out when they arrive at the period of self-government."

The General has said to us this afternoon that Great Britain is perfectly willing to leave when the Egyptians arrive at that point—which, of course, is never, never, never as long as conditions remain as they are now, or as they have been ever since the British went into the occupation of Egypt. It is a challenge to the British today, after having been in Egypt over forty years, for one of the British administrators in that country to get up and tell us that ninety per cent of the people are illiterate. (Applause.)

I hold no brief for ourselves in the Philippines. I will just relieve the General's mind at this time, and say that I think we ought to get out of the Philippines. I am in favor of that. I am asking no other nation to drink a dose of medicine that I am not willing for my own nation to drink, and I think that the applications of these principles should be an application that is world-wide.

In connection with Egypt, then, the British were planning not to get out of Egypt, and the proof of it is to be found in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, which, when its terms became known, was the very beginning of the Egyptian nationalist movement. One of the principal points of the agreement of 1904 was that France was to have a free hand in Morocco if she would call off her dogs that were barking at the British in Egypt and allow the British to have a free hand there. It is written right in the text of that agreement, and it really is one of the things at the heart of that agreement and that prompted it. There was no intention in 1904, and there has been no intention since, on the part of the British, of ever getting out of Egypt. They wanted to stay there if they could.

Now during the period between 1904 and 1914, the situation in Egypt was like the situation in other countries subject to alien rule. There was the rise of a nationalist movement. Begin to educate the people, tell them about the barons of Runnymede and how they forced the hand of their sovereign. Tell them about Joan of Arc and how she rid her country of the foreigners. Tell them about Hampden and the Stamp Act. Tell them about George Washington and the period at Valley Forge. Tell them about the men of the French revolution that fought the battle of Jemappes. Tell them about the Italian Risorgimento movement—any history that we study. How have we become great and strong—we Anglo-Saxons, we of British blood and American blood? How have the French become a great nation? How have the Italians? Because they have done in the past those things that we tell these people that they are not to do and that they cannot do; and if they attempt to follow the glorious example of our own forefathers, we will call them obtrusive politicians. (Applause.)

I am going to say just a few words connected with the events which have happened since 1914. In 1914 this Protectorate was proclaimed over Egypt, a unilateral proclamation, not accepted by the Egyptian people. The Egyptians fought by the side of the British during the World War. When

I say fought, I use that word advisedly. The General himself has given a very handsome tribute to the work that the Egyptians did during the World War. He himself has said that he didn't know how the British would have gotten along in Palestine if it had not been for that help from Egypt. In 1918, at the end of the World War, the Egyptians expected the promises to be kept; and all the sad tragedies and troubles that have occurred in Egypt since the end of the World War have been due to the unsuccessful attempt of the British government to establish a permanent Protectorate over Egypt. This was written into the Treaty of Versailles. The delegates of Egypt came to Paris. They were not given a hearing, because of official British opposition, although in 1915 I attended a press luncheon in London given to the representatives of the then neutral press at which Lord Grey (Sir Edward Grey, as he was at that time) spoke.

He said, "Tell your peoples throughout the world that this war is a great moral issue. It is not for any material benefits of any kind. What we want and the one thing that the British Empire wants alone, that which we are fighting and giving our sons to die for, is that every people, great and small, shall have the right and the privilege to work out its own destinies in accordance with its own ideas after the World War is over."

He didn't limit his pledge merely to Europe. He was thinking also of the whole world, or at least we were thinking that, we who heard his words. Was Sir Edward indulging in hypocritical cant or was he voicing an ideal? Did he mean simply to give the right of self-determination to peoples who were subject to those whom we were fighting in the war, thus weakening them, or was it the proclamation of a great principle that was to rule the world in the future?

Now since 1918 the policy of the British government in Egypt has been the policy of "Schrecklichkeit," of frightfulness, of intimidation, of repression, in the eyes of the Egyptian people. I say this in all charity. We Americans have adopted this policy, too. All nations that have imperial tendencies have adopted it, and I suppose if I had been a British General in Egypt and a British administrator there, common sense would have indicated that I should have believed in and adopted such a policy myself. The question is not what you do after you get into the galley, but, why did you go into the galley? And there they were! If independence was granted, as it was, it was not the result of the recommendation of the Milner Commission, which had been ignored. Two years after the Milner Commission had recommended it, the continued agitation of Zaghlul Pasha and his partisans made the British—forced them to—proclaim the Free State.

I have an abhorrence of violence of any kind and I believe that the Egyptians were getting into a very dangerous state. I thought that Zaghlul Pasha (and I have told him this more than once) had gone too far, especially in the last year and a half; but viewing the circumstances as they existed at the time, there never would have been any Free State in 1922 in Ireland or in Egypt if there hadn't been that agitation and the insistent determination to run their own affairs on the part of these people. It is nonsense to speak of the granting of independence as "the gracious pleasure of His Majesty."

The present situation is not wholly the fault of the British government. I believe that it is partially the fault also of the Egyptian people. The fault is shared by both sides. But when we read of the recent events in Egypt

and the type of ultimatum, with the demands presented to the Egyptian people, in view of the fact that the fault was shared by both sides in the past, a mistaken policy, a policy of blunders, a policy that was short-sighted, a policy that was wholly and totally against the recommendations of the Milner Commission—in view of the fact that it was a shared responsibility (the regrettable assassination of this man who was my friend and in whose home I have been a privileged guest), I say that when that thing occurred, for the British government to write an ultimatum that smacked so much of the Austrian ultimatum of 1914 to Serbia, with which it has points of striking similarity, then I think that the time has come when public opinion throughout the world should condemn that sort of a thing in the year 1924 after the adoption of the Geneva protocol. (Applause.)

Now in conclusion I will say this: the amount of the indemnity demanded was excessive; and knowing General Stack as I knew him, I believe that if he were alive today to speak of this in connection with the assassination of any other British General in Egypt, he would say the same thing. The demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from the Sudan without any international treaty or agreement either between Egypt and Great Britain, or between the two parties and the League, was taking advantage of a situation that had arisen in the death of a great and honored man to settle the question for ulterior political purposes by sweeping these people off their feet. In regard to the irrigation of the Nile, of the Gezira region in the Sudan, the demands were totally unjustifiable as well as irrelevant to the issue.

What we have here is a manifestation of the old-fashioned type of diplomacy, of the kind that the World War and all the new morality raised by the World War has unqualifiedly condemned in our enemies, and therefore it should be unqualifiedly condemned when it manifests itself in ourselves or in our friends. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Before we open the discussion to questions and answers, Sir Willoughby Dickinson has been kind enough to say that he would open the discussion for us briefly. Sir Willoughby, as most of you know, was a former delegate from Great Britain to the League of Nations Assembly, and Chairman of the Committee on Minorities of the League of Nations Union. He is President, I think, of the World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches, a distinguished British Liberal, and we are very glad to have him open the discussion and give us another British point of view.

SIR WILLOUGHBY H. DICKINSON

MR. CHAIRMAN, ladies and gentlemen: It is a great pleasure to address this remarkable assembly, for two reasons especially. First of all, because one has been led to believe that the Americans don't care about anything outside America, and, nevertheless, I see that you can gather together so large and distinguished an assembly to discuss a question of Egypt. Indeed I may add that since I have been in this country it has been my experience that I find all through your population an intense interest in the affairs of the rest of the world.

Secondly, I can't help mentioning that I think some little bit of responsibility for this trouble is due to America. (Applause.) A very distinguished American laid down in very noble terms, with all of which

I agree, that every nation should have the right of self-determination over its own form of government. That is a magnificent theory, but when you come to the application of it, it is a little more difficult, and I only wish that your great nation were helping us to apply that principle in many parts of Europe at the present day. (Applause.) It is a little legacy you have left to us, and we are trying to apply it as best we can. When the British troops were marching out of Dublin, when we evacuated Ireland, an old Irish woman waved her shawl to them, and she said, "Goodbye, me darlin's, good luck to you! We will now be able to fight in peace!" (Laughter.)

Now that is very much what is happening not only in Ireland and in Egypt, but in several other parts of Europe, and somebody or another will suffer for it unless wise action is taken very rapidly. I thought to myself, you have a fine object lesson of the problem in Egypt in the two magnificent speeches we have just listened to. We had the speech of the experienced administrator in Egypt, which I am sure you have listened to with the greatest interest. We have also had a very good representative of that sort of feeling with which we all sympathize, but which we all must realize the difficulty of giving effect to; that is the feeling that all men are equal and all men must be treated exactly in the same way. (Applause.)

Now I haven't time to meet all the arguments that have just been raised, but I think in one or two things Dr. Gibbons has been a little bit unfair. As a matter of fact, Britain has always desired to leave Egypt. It was announced by Mr. Gladstone when we won the war there and conquered the Sudan. It was announced in 1887, in perfectly specific words by Lord Salisbury, when he said, "It isn't open to us to assume the Protectorate of Egypt because His Majesty's government have over and over again pledged themselves that they would not do so."

And now we have since 1922—I am quite ready to admit there was a considerable amount of delay—definitely made this announcement: that the British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state.

It is quite true that in making that announcement we coupled with it certain conditions to which we asked the sovereign state of Egypt, as she will be, to agree to certain conditions that were in no way derogatory to her sovereignty but were necessary not only for England but for the rest of Egypt and also, as I think, for the rest of the world. That policy has now been reaffirmed by a speech which I read the other day made by our Prime Minister, in which he said the British government had no intention of going back upon its decision of 1922.

Now, why is it that England has remained so long in Egypt? People imagine that we have very sinister motives in doing so. I dare say some people have made money there. I don't know whether they have or whether they haven't, but I can assure you of this: the only reason which has kept us in Egypt has been the profound belief, which I believe is shared by almost all who know the circumstances, that the administration of Britain in Egypt has resulted in good. It has been successful. (Applause.) It has produced peace out of war; order out of chaos; prosperity from the most abject poverty; and it has not been harsh to the population. Here again I think that our speaker was a bit unfair to General Hoskins.

He charged the British nation with being a sort of superman, always taking the position that we are superior to the colored races. That may be true with a large number of Britishers. It is true, I regret to say, with a considerable number of your own countrymen. (Applause.) But from the point of view of the British government, I don't believe that accusation can be made good. All the great administrators of Egypt have given their time and their labor for the benefit of the poorer portion of those countries, and it is under the belief that we were doing good that we remained in Egypt.

Now there have been certain conditions made. One of them is a condition that under the future system of Egypt the rights of foreigners should be especially respected. Please remember that Egypt is really not a little country that the world can afford to leave alone to sow its wild oats. That is what Dr. Gibbons said just now. He likened Egypt to himself, I believe. (Laughter.) At any rate, to what he represented himself to be, as a young man who would have been so magnificently superior to what he is now, if he had only been left alone, or perhaps it was vice versa, I don't exactly remember. (Laughter.) But at any rate his argument was: "Leave Egypt, leave Egyptians alone; let them be as we were in Runnymede; let them be as in the time of Joan of Arc." I assure you, ladies and gentlemen, neither Europe nor the world can afford to allow Egypt to go back to the ages of Joan of Arc or of Runnymede. (Applause.) One of the remarkable features of Egypt is this: that the population is largely European. Lord Milner's report stated that Egypt was rapidly becoming Europeanized. Almost all of the nations of Europe have interests in Egypt. It wouldn't be wise to allow a new condition of affairs to spring up in Egypt in which Egypt might possibly go back to the condition in which it was prior to 1882.

I know that my time is very limited, and therefore I cannot make the full defense I would like to make of the present attitude of the British government. I am not a supporter, politically, of the British government. I am a member of the Liberal party and have been, in Parliament and elsewhere, always connected with the Liberal party, but I must say this: I do not think that under the circumstances any government could have acted otherwise than it did in relation to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Mind you, we have not yet attained a position in which we can absolutely disregard all resort to force. I am an ardent believer in the League of Nations. I am working for the League of Nations. Some day, perhaps, the League of Nations may be able to establish itself as a police force for the whole of the world. That is possible in the far distance. We have not arrived at that yet, and therefore there are occasions when force must be exerted, and on this occasion it was clearly necessary. There was a cruel assassination, not a merely isolated incident. It was part and parcel of an agitation against the whole British, and indeed I may say against the whole foreign community in Egypt. If it had been allowed to go on, it would have spread with far more serious results. The action of the British government has resulted in this: without shedding a drop of blood, without wounding any one, without doing any harm, we succeeded in changing the government of Egypt in such a form that they are willing now to negotiate with us, ready for a permanent settlement of the difficulties in Egypt. Therefore, in that respect, I must say I believe the British government acted absolutely right.

It is stated the action was so illegal that it ought to be referred to the League of Nations. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a question one can't argue before a great meeting here, but I may say this, that in my opinion, there is only one way in which it could come before the League of Nations and that is if it were a war or threat of war, or if it threatened to disturb international relations.

You cannot really say that an action on the part of the British government that had actual rights in Egypt to restore order was either a war or a threat of war. There might have been some circumstance which would disturb international relationships, but then the League of Nations would or would not take that into consideration as it might think well. And in my opinion, I believe that the League of Nations should be very cautious before it starts doing something which is really beyond the immediate scope of its work (namely, to keep the peace between distinct nations) by interfering in matters which are clearly of a domestic concern. It is wiser for the League of Nations not to deal with this matter. But at the same time, personally, I may give as my own opinion this: I think the time has arrived when not only Great Britain but all the nations of the world, should realize that in setting up an institution like the League of Nations, they have established an organ which has the right to be consulted in all these matters of international concern, and therefore in a case such as this, when the permanent arrangements between Egypt and England and, indeed, the rest of the world have to be settled, I believe they can only be settled on a definite basis by taking into consultation the League of Nations and the whole of the world, or at any rate, the whole of those nations who form the members of the League of Nations, and giving them an opportunity of discussing and considering the matter.

I still hope that the British government may take this course. I see nothing in their actions up to the present moment to preclude them from doing so. If they do so, then I believe there will be an opportunity of finding a permanent settlement, and the only thing in conclusion that I will say is that if the League of Nations becomes, as I am sure it will become, an organ for devising satisfactory arrangements for regulating international relations, it is a thousand pities that among those who will be able to give their counsel there is not the great American people on this side of the water. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: I am not going to give Dr. Gibbons a chance to reply. I am afraid he would be almost too brilliant in his reply, but I would like to have questions now addressed to any of the speakers, and perhaps if you address one to Mr. Gibbons he may steal some time to say a word or two in answer to Sir Willoughby. But I would rather have questions; as you know we do, of course, have speeches occasionally from the floor if they are especially good ones and especially brief ones.

DR. JOSEPH COLLINS: Assuming that the Suez Canal is essential to the life of the British Empire, would the British Empire be justified in giving to the Egyptians the advice which Dr. Gibbons suggested that he might give his son, knowing that perhaps that advice would not only lead the son to destroy himself but even strangle the whole family?

DR. GIBBONS: In answer to that I would say simply this: in making the statement that I made, I was arguing the whole general question. In

a short speech of twenty-five minutes it is impossible for one to go into all the details of a settlement that might be effected between Egypt and Great Britain.

In the first place, I might say that we are unwarranted in supposing that the granting of independence to Egypt would strangle the British Empire. That has yet to be proven.

In the second place, all the schemes (even those of Zaghlul Pasha, who did go, as I said, to extremes during the course of the last year of his administration) have presupposed that Great Britain should have the right to continue to guard the Suez Canal. There is a big difference between the guarding of the Suez Canal—which wasn't mentioned in the ultimatum, as it was understood by the Egyptians as well as the English—and the question of irrigation in the Gezira district of the Sudan. I want to be perfectly clear here. I am afraid perhaps some of you may have misunderstood my position. In the year 1916, when I had gone to Egypt at the invitation of Sir John Maxwell who was Commander of the British forces at that time, I worked very hard to get from the Sultan of Egypt, and I did secure from him, an interview which was of great usefulness in clearing up the situation at that time, in which the Sultan said that it never had been in the minds of the Egyptian people to contest the special position of Great Britain in Egypt. They don't contest it now, and they never would for one minute raise any obstacle, and they have not raised any such obstacles, to Great Britain taking the fullest measures possible for the protection of herself on the Suez Canal. But it is a far cry from the Suez Canal and the protection of the Suez Canal by a great power like Great Britain to the kind of a control that Great Britain has exercised over Egypt in the past, and to the complete fulfilment of all the demands that are made in the present ultimatum.

THE CHAIRMAN: Both the question and the answer were the sort I like—brief and to the point.

Mr. Bishara Nahas—Mr. Nahas is an Egyptian merchant.

MR. NAHAS: I asked to put a question. I know that usually questions are not answered in a debate, and I do not expect my questions to be answered. I am going to take opportunity of what Mr. McDonald, our Chairman, said, that we can have a short speech, if it is short. I will try to make it very short.

When Sir Willoughby was speaking about the Irish woman who said, "We can fight in peace," it reminded me of an Arab proverb: "My cousin and myself are enemies, but any enemy of my cousin is also my enemy."

That is a very old Arab proverb.

Adding to what Dr. Gibbons said about England saying that she has always wanted to leave Egypt: I remember a few years ago I went to see the barracks occupied by the English soldiers in Egypt near Alexandria, and I was shown about by an English officer. I exclaimed, "But there is no electric light here!"

With a twinkle in his eye he said, "You see we are here temporarily and we intend to stay temporarily and make no improvement in the place."

That is how England is staying in Egypt. She is there temporarily and does not intend to make any improvement.

My question is the following: What right has England to be in Egypt? We have to take always the principle of any question, not the facts as they are forty or forty-two years after the occupation. Let's go at the bottom of it, at the beginning of it. What right today has England to be in Egypt? What right has any country to assume that another country is totally unable to govern itself? Is it for humanity's sake that Great Britain is in Egypt? For civilization's sake? I say that Egyptians are more civilized than any other country in the world, any other nationality. They are a very old civilization, but as Dr. Gibbons said, they are a different civilization, an Eastern civilization, which is totally different from a Western civilization.

I contend also, is it unselfishness for England to remain there? England is not there unselfishly. No country goes into another country unselfishly. Perhaps I might make an exception of what the United States has done in Cuba. (Laughter.) I am not discussing that point now. The great problem is the Suez Canal, which is the main link between England and her colonies in India, as it was stated.

And then the second question: In whose name Lord Kitchener has conquered the Sudan? When he went to the conquest of the Sudan in 1898, by whom was he appointed? By England? But whose governor was he? Egypt's. It was in the name of Egypt. We know that from the declaration of Lord Kitchener himself; and the statements of Lord Kimberly also later in the House of Parliament in London. They are there to show us in whose name the Sudan was conquered, when the English led the Egyptian troops to the conquest of the Sudan. Hicks Pasha and Gordon Pasha failed first, but they were in the Sudan not in the name of England, they were in the Sudan in the name of Egypt, and they were paid by Egypt, too, adds Dr. Gibbons.

Therefore, my questions are twofold: First, by what right is England in Egypt, and in whose name is England today in the Sudan? (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, this is a double-barreled question. I think you all heard it. By what right is Britain in Egypt? In whose name did Kitchener conquer the Sudan?

I was just discussing the answer with my friends to the right, and I am going to ask Ambassador Morgenthau if he won't answer a part of this question, and if he doesn't answer it adequately, perhaps one of our British friends will complete the answer.

HONORABLE HENRY MORGENTHAU: Ladies and gentlemen: I was very much amused when I heard Professor Gibbons tell about his son. The professor was kind enough to dedicate a book to me not long ago, and in it he said he did so because he thought that through my experience (I am not quoting the exact words) I was a little wiser than he. I have a son and my son is benefiting by and adopting my experience. (Applause.) That is all I am going to say about this. You must draw the inference.

Now, my friends, I have been in Egypt, and I found out, even as late as 1914, that the aftermath of the methods and way Ismail lived and conducted Egypt was still felt. He had put that country into bankruptcy. The country, financially and economically was ruined by him. I met

Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive of Egypt. I had a very interesting talk with him in Cairo, and numerous talks with him when he afterwards occupied his residence on the Bosphorus, which was directly opposite the American summer embassy. All through those conversations, he never spoke with any solicitude or consideration for his people. It was simply a selfish attitude of the owner of a piece of property who wanted to know, and calmly considered what would be to his personal advantage, whether to continue to cooperate with the British or throw himself and his destinies into the hands of the Turks. He decided cold-bloodedly that the Germans were going to succeed in the war, and therefore he concluded to side with the Turks and Germans.

Now, my friends, when we look at these people, we mustn't think of the few men who are at the head of the government. The Egyptian people would not be benefited by having a monarch or a despot rule over them. We want to look at the two lines of thought at present prevalent in this country. One of these is to hold aloof—remain isolated—and the other that we should do as the British have done—be the pilots, the reorganizers of weak nations, help them. It is a wonderful opportunity. I have been fortunate enough to go to Greece, live there for a while, and be able to help that historic country back to her feet. Mr. Davis is sitting here in our midst. He went out and settled the Memel dispute. We Americans ought to applaud and approve of Great Britain's attitude. We are not ready, nor is the League of Nations prepared, to police the world, but Great Britain has gone into these various parts of the globe and has spent her money and her men to bring about better conditions.

Every one will admit that backward countries cannot have democracies until they are trained to it. These men like Ismail Pasha or Abbas Hilmi, or his brother, Mehemet Ali, whom I met, have no idea of giving their people democracies. What is wanted in this great world is that the intelligent peoples, the advanced countries, should help the others. Now, it is all very nice to try and play upon that feeling that we all have, that we should help the under-dog. You are not helping the under-dog unless you really extricate him. (Applause.) Merely to say, "Let him stay there; let him wallow in his own dirt; let him become diseased; let him disappear" does not help him. I tell you that I know of my personal knowledge that the British have helped Egypt and that the mass of Egyptians who are not fanatically for self-determination are very much in favor of having a protectorate, and I had the same experience with the Turks. At one time the Turks wanted a protector. I was very much astonished, though, when I asked them, "Suppose we don't accept a mandate, who would be your next choice?" I believe that there are not ten people in this room who can guess their choice. They told me the Japanese. I asked them why, and they said that they understood their oriental thoughts and methods.

Now, my friends, all I want to say is that you may consider that Great Britain may have made a mistake. She may have gone too far. But I believe there are certain times when we must withhold our judgment, when we don't know all the facts. I think that Great Britain has undertaken, as Kipling put it, "the white man's burden," and it doesn't behoove us Americans, as long as we are shirking doing our share, to criticize Great Britain. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Sir Willoughby said he would like to complete Ambassador Morgenthau's reply to those two questions which were raised by our Egyptian friends, the one as to Britain's right, and the other as to in whose name Kitchener conquered the Sudan.

SIR WILLOUGHBY DICKINSON: I think, Mr. Chairman, that people really ought to understand quite clearly by what right Britain is in Egypt and the Sudan. We are there by the right of agreement with Egypt. Our officers, the British officers, are actually appointed by the Egyptian government by agreement with the British. Sir Lee Stack was appointed by the Egyptian government. General Hoskins was appointed by the Egyptian government. It has been hitherto an arrangement for the benefit of both parties, accepted by both parties, and now that it appears that the Egyptian nation is no longer in favor of that agreement, the British government has, as I have pointed out to you, announced its intention of handing over the independence to Egypt upon certain definite conditions. Therefore that is the real answer with regard to Egypt. With regard to the Sudan, as General Hoskins has said, the Sudan was never under Egypt. It was conquered by the British officers with the assistance of the Egyptian troops, and since that time, it has been administered again in agreement with the Egyptian government, under a process which is called the condominium. So that changes the situation altogether, and although the situation may change at any time, it hasn't definitely changed, but may have to be changed, as I have pointed out, with the joint consent of the Egyptians and the British government.

MR. V. EVERIT MACY: I understand that the question of the Sudan is one of the important points dividing England and Egypt. I would like to ask Professor Gibbons whether he thinks the Sudanese, who I think number something over seven millions, and occupy a territory as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, would be better under the Egyptian government, with possibly some wild oats, or under the English administration. I haven't heard any discussion of the self-determination of the Sudanese as yet.

DR. GIBBONS: In what I said I think I made very clear that I never believed for one minute that the Egyptian government would immediately or within a very short time—perhaps it might take a very long time—rule themselves as well and as effectively as the British are able to rule them with centuries behind them of training and education. I have been in the Sudan, where I was the guest of Sir Reginald Wingate in Khartum, and have gone over the whole situation with Sir Lee Stack, who at that time was associated with Sir Reginald Wingate in the administration of the Sudan. I have also had the very great privilege of going to Omdurman as one of thirty Europeans absolutely without arms on the night of the birthday of the Prophet and being absolutely safe and feeling safe there in old Omdurman where the Mahdi's power had been broken. I have always, in everything that I have written and everything that I have said, paid the very fullest tribute to the British administration. I have seen a great deal of it, I have lived under it, and have been with these men, and have generally been their guests everywhere I have gone, and I have the very fullest admiration for their administration. I wouldn't for one minute think that the Egyptians could administer the

Sudan now better than the English. However, there is this to be said: it is a thing to be remembered, and I think it is one of the things that divides us in this question as a sort of unbridgeable gulf. (It is manifest in what Mr. Morgenthau has said in his answer in regard to the situation.) It is the old argument of racial superiority that has been given here ever since the beginning of this talk, as to whether these people would be better off and what kind of man their sovereign was and all that sort of thing. I admit their radical difference from us—and the difference between their civilization, their ideals, if you wish—and ours. What I said is that these people have, as our Egyptian friend has pointed out in what he has said, a civilization that is not necessarily inferior to ours because it is different from ours. They may be happier and more prosperous and like to live in their way better than in our way. Now if we are going to make an Occidental country of the Sudan, by all means if we are going to Occidentalize the world—Anglo-Saxonize the world—let's not only stay there, but increase our troops and increase our personnel and run the country according to our western methods. They have their eastern methods. They believe that they are civilized. We don't think that they are. After all, in the final analysis, the question boils down to this—it isn't our country, and it is their country.

MR. MACY: I don't think Professor Gibbons quite answered my question.

My question was if the Sudanese are to be ruled by somebody (he says they are to be ruled by Egypt) have they expressed their desire to be ruled by Egypt, and does he think Egypt would rule them better than England. That was my question which he has not answered yet.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macy has an impression, justifiable or otherwise, that Dr. Gibbons didn't answer the Sudanese part of the question.

DR. GIBBONS: I shall be glad to answer that. We have to realize in regard to these peoples out there that nationalism doesn't mean the same thing to them that it means to us. Remember that the people of Sudan are people who have the same religion as the Egyptians. Wherever you go in the East, if you see these people you are impressed with the fact that their nationalist movement is at the same time a cultural movement, as all nationalist movements have been. I would say without hesitation that those who live in the Sudan who are educated, the educated men of the Sudan, the heads of the tribes and all the people who are lettered, their clergy and so on, do not desire the separation from Egypt. On the contrary they have great dreams of what is going to happen to the future of Islam culturally if the contact with Egypt is maintained.

I beg to submit that I did answer the part of Mr. Macy's question about whether they would be better governed by the English than by the Egyptians. They would be better governed by the English than by the Egyptians, most decidedly. A person who tried to answer that question in any other way would be foolish. I have never inferred, in anything I said this afternoon, that I thought they would be better off in a material way under Egyptian than English rule. The point is that there is a feeling of solidarity—a very strong feeling of solidarity—among the Islamic peoples today. Are they going to be allowed an opportunity for the development of their peculiar civilization and for the fitting of themselves into the scheme of things in the twentieth century world, or are

they going to continue to be separated and governed and ruled by elder brothers of Occidental civilization? If we adopt the latter scheme, in a material way (as we understand material blessings) they may continue to be better off under British rule than under their own, but it requires and will require as long as you and I are alive, large bodies of troops and occasionally repressive measures, if we are going to check their aspiration to rule themselves.

I think I have tried to answer this question clearly. The Sudan contains tribes of various sorts and various kinds, but most of them do belong to Islam, actually or potentially. They are Mohammedans, if only in the making and their Islamic faith is the greatest thing in the world to them—especially to the neophytes. They look upon the Egyptians as brothers because the Egyptians are also of the Islamic faith and their nationalism is more understandable to the Sudanese than our nationalism, or than our political institutions and system of justice. In a large part as they become educated they learn to speak the same language, and there is a cultural basis for the nationalist movement among the Islamic peoples that we would be very foolish to ignore when we consider the problem of how we are going to deal with them in the future. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Now there is somebody in my immediate neighborhood who said that most of the latter part of Dr. Gibbons' talk just now was inaccurate, and I am wondering whether she would agree to say so publicly.

MRS. MARGUERITE HARRISON: I have just returned from a trip to the East, and I have found everywhere that I have been in Turkey, Persia and Arabia that Islamic solidarity no longer exists. Dr. Gibbons, it is a myth, nationalism to a large extent has taken its place. Don't you believe that the antagonism between the Sudanese and the Egyptians is such, racially and otherwise, that the Sudanese, who as you admit will have to be ruled by somebody, would prefer to be ruled by Great Britain rather than be ruled by the Egyptians? Personally I think so. I would like to ask your opinion. I would also like to have you state if you think there is any evidence of Islamic solidarity in the action of Ib'n Saud, leader of the Wahabis, a Mohammedan sect, who took Mecca recently and drove out Husein of Hedjaz, Khalif and Sherif of Mecca.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mrs. Marguerite Harrison whom many of us know, and who has just returned from the Near East, asks Dr. Gibbons whether he hasn't overstressed the solidarity of Islam and whether nationalism is not cutting across it, and whether therefore the national feeling of the Sudanese and their hatred on various grounds of the Egyptians would not be greater than their feeling of a common bond of religion. She would like to have Dr. Gibbons' opinion of that.

DR. GIBBONS: I have never believed in the solidarity of Islam in the sense that it has been so often written of by a great many political writers, that is, as a bugaboo for European diplomacy and extra-European expansion. I have pointed that out clearly and frequently in all I have written. The question I speak of is something different. Solidarity in Islam, that Islamic peoples should consider one another as brothers, is no more natural than that all the Christian peoples should consider one another as brothers. There was no solidarity of Christendom when

they said naughty things about the Germans and the Germans said just as naughty things about us. There is no solidarity of Islam in that sense, there couldn't be, it isn't in the nature of human relations. What I say is simply this, that the cultural bonds that unite the Islamic peoples today in their state of what I might call embryonic nationalism, because it has hardly attained to more than that, is a factor that we have to reckon with in regard to the future and it is also a fact that must be reckoned with among peoples, a large majority of whom are unlettered. The influence of their leaders is very strong upon them.

As to the illustration that Mrs. Harrison gives, the revolutions and civil strife among these people, they do fight among themselves. All races and creeds do. But let us remember this, that as we look at the map of the world today, in all these nascent movements toward nationalism in Islamic countries, there is a common bond that unites them. Nationalism hasn't cut across the great fact that they are all of them under the control of, and they all of them believe that they are being exploited by the nations of Europe. Whether they are or not, they believe it and the thing a person thinks is the thing that really counts. Occidental civilization, as expressed in the Near East and in Africa, by holding these people in tutelage, is growing increasingly hateful. The moment they try to break their bonds, there is a common solidarity in the common struggle against European lordship and the pretension to domination of so-called Christian civilization.

It is a solidarity not so much of Islam as the fact that all these Islamic lands, one after another, side by side, are under the control of European nations, and most of them under the control of Great Britain. Even Saud in his present revolt, of which Mrs. Harrison spoke, contrary to being an argument on her side is an argument just the opposite. It is because the Sherif Husein of Mecca, elevated there as king by European diplomacy, was thought to be a tool of the British Imperial aims that the Wahabis took the action that they have against him. Students of Islamic countries realize that. We can cite also the revolt of the Sudanese battalion in the Sudan, which is symptomatic. I have talked to a good many of these Sudanese. I would say this about the people of Sudan, that they are near the possibility of rapprochement with Egypt in the future—it won't come right away. None of these things come right away. We can't expect these people to form a solid nationality or to work out their destiny in the way that we would approve in a few years, any more than we could have expected the English and Scotch to get together in a few years. They, too, will have to have centuries of border raids before they finally agree to come together and to form a common nation.

This Sudanese battalion revolt is an illustration of the beginning of a movement of solidarity among these people. I think that if you would take the opinion of the Sudanese today, it would be against breaking the present system that controls them, that is the condominium of England and Egypt. They are not ready to fall on the necks of the Egyptians—I wouldn't say that—but at the same time they don't want to be separated completely from Egypt and have a border across which there can be no communications, because if that were done, it would break one of the great hopes that the Islamic peoples have today of arriving by cultural

improvement at a future solidarity that perhaps might be called more cultural than purely political. Of course they will continue to fight among themselves, and I don't believe in the Pan-Islamic movement and never have, but I think that the seeds of nationalism there, viewing the fact that the Sudan and Egypt are side by side, could possibly and might in the course of a generation or two work out to the improvement and betterment both of the Egyptian and Sudanese people.

In Czecho-Slovakia right today you have an illustration of what I mean. Take the Slovaks at the Peace Conference. If the argument had been brought up at that time, that the Slovaks should have a plebiscite to decide whether they wanted to be ruled over by the Czechs, they would have voted against it, a great many of them; but it is the hope of the Czecho-Slovak state that these people will come together in the course of time.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am a little embarrassed. We have twelve minutes more at the outside. I have a most interesting letter here from a very distinguished scholar, who puts an interesting point of view, and I have suggestions from two or three interesting persons who might speak for a couple of minutes each. Perhaps I might read this letter first.

This is a letter—Dr. Gibbons told me to say that both he and General Hoskins agree with this letter, and the General qualifies it a little by saying in general he agrees with it—from Captain William Yale, who was for six years in the Near East, and a special agent of the State Department, was associated with the Near Eastern Division of the Peace Conference, was two years in business in Cairo and at Port Saïd. He says:

“Our topic for discussion this afternoon, British Policy in Egypt, has been overshadowed by a greater and broader question, imperialism versus nationalism. The British policy in Egypt past and present, is a very definite and tangible subject, one which is well worth the careful study of all of us who are interested in statecraft. It throws a searching light on British ideals, British mentality and British policies, as well as giving us a glimpse of oriental methods and ideas. But our discussion of imperialism versus nationalism leads to little more than an occasion for British repartee.

“The British Empire today like the rest of the political world is in a state of flux. To such a degree is this true that it is difficult to say whether or not the British policy in Egypt is or is not a manifestation of imperialism. Certainly the Egyptian problem is for Great Britain an imperial problem and in consequence her policy in Egypt is of necessity one which takes into consideration the problems of the Empire as a whole.

“One of these considerations is the security of the Empire's line of communication. It is self-evident that the life of the British Empire depends absolutely upon a secure control of the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, and it is perfectly clear that Great Britain will and must follow a policy in Egypt calculated to give her this control until such time as an international organization will develop with such supreme powers as to adequately protect these lines of communication. Such a time is in the far distance as long as Russia, Germany and the United States remain outside the League of Nations. The existence of Egypt

is one thing. The security of the British Empire is quite another. The British Empire is a political factor of world-wide importance, and I believe that there are few in this gathering who would care to see this great world force for law and order jeopardized by the so-called nationalism of 14,000,000 Egyptians. (Applause.)

"This so-called Egyptian nationalism, is it nationalism or is it something else? Certainly the claim of the Egyptian nationalist to the Sudan has as much relation to nationalism as would a demand by us to annex Canada. It is stark imperialism, but why? There is beneath this demand of the Egyptians for the Sudan something other than a fear lest the water of the Nile be withheld from the fields of Egypt. This something else is something of very great importance, it is nothing less than the struggle for Africa.

"Ladies and gentlemen, there is a struggle going on in Africa today of vast importance to us of the Western World. Its outcome we cannot foresee, but its significance we should not fail to grasp. It is not so much a territorial struggle to see who shall possess Africa, for the Islamic and Oriental powers are far from strong enough to wage such a struggle, but it is a struggle to determine whether Oriental or Western culture shall predominate in Africa. Already in Kenia, British East Africa, the Indians have made their demands of the British, while for a number of years the inner councils of Islam have been pressing the penetration of Central Africa. Encompassed by Christian powers, the Moslems have realized sooner than we have that their only chance of expansion lies among the blacks of Central Africa, and the key to Central Africa is the Sudan.

"The Egyptian people were offered by the British declaration of 1922 a fairly liberal charter upon which to build an independent national state, but the extremist leaders preferred to make their foundation on their own form of religious imperialism, for the unfettered control of the Sudan by the Egyptians would have given Islam a new and stronger foothold in Africa. But then it must be remembered that in Egypt nationalism is gauged by the forces of religious enthusiasm upon which it depends. There is no distinctive Egyptian culture. The arts, the language, the literature and the ideals are those of Islam, and so the nationalism of Egypt is mostly the nationalism of Islam. Thus, the struggle in Egypt is incorrectly described as a struggle between imperialism and nationalism. It is rather a struggle between the cultural imperialism of Islam and the commercial and political imperialism of the Western World." (Applause.)

Now having read that, I am going to give two members of the Islam world a chance with two minutes each to say what they think about it. If Mr. Hossain will come up here and say in two minutes what he thinks about the cultural imperialism of Islam, we will be glad to give it to him. Mr. Hossain, many of you know, a scholar and a friend from India whom we are always glad to welcome! (Applause.)

MR. SYUD HOSSAIN: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: In the two minutes allotted to me, I should first like to occupy myself with an affirmation of principle. It seems to me very important that in these discussions too much detail and special pleading for or against any proposition should not be allowed entirely to obscure the fundamental principles

involved. I should like, as a representative of the East, to put before you this simple affirmation. The points of view to which expression have been given by three distinguished speakers to the right of the Chairman are points of view, in so far as they apply to principles, which are utterly repudiated by the East.

Mr. Morgenthau's notion of the needs of the under-dog and the paternal beneficence which the under-dog in the East has always had at the hands of the paternal governments of the West, is a point of view which perhaps will find very little endorsement from any under-dogs anywhere.

The usefulness of these discussions for which the Foreign Policy Association has earned a well-merited reputation, lies in the fact that we are all of us today in the world groping in our respective ways for peace. In this country more particularly one of the most universal and one of the most laudable aspirations today is an aspiration to achieve an enduring and just peace in the world. (Applause.)

It is precisely against this background of the need for world peace that these questions have to be considered. You have got, ladies and gentlemen, in this country, to realize that this whole assumption that the West has any kind of a providential duty laid upon it to go and grab the East and force its own ideas of life upon the East, is fundamentally fallacious. It has already involved the world in colossal slaughter and immeasurable suffering. According to the statistics issued by your State Department in the last great war, 10,000,000 young men, belonging to all the nations of the world, to your nation and my nation and other nations, were offered up as a sacrifice at the altar of European imperialism. Do you want that kind of thing to go on? Is the only possible condition for us different nations and peoples in the world to live, that we should periodically engage in fratricidal slaughter? The moral foundation that the West has in the East is nil. The only basis for domination of the East is that the West has been able to harness the destructive powers of modern science to the business of imperialism. It has no moral foundation.

I should just like to close with an attempt at an answer to the question that was put from this table by Mr. Nahas, a question which, as Mr. Nahas himself anticipated, was not answered. He asked what was the justification of the British being in Egypt and he asked in whose name they were in Egypt. I think the answer to that question, curiously enough, may perhaps be best given in the words of an American.

It happened that Mark Twain was in England at the time of Queen Victoria's Jubilee when great celebrations were going on, great jollification and all the rest. Mark Twain being a simple American democrat was rather impressed and even puzzled by these demonstrations, so he gave a little thought to the matter and in his journal he wrote. These are the words taken from his journal:

"Victoria rules over one-fourth of the habitable area of the globe. Victoria rules over one-fifth of the population of the world, which reminds me that the British are mentioned in the Bible: 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth'."

So the answer to Mr. Nahas is that it is this quality of invincible meekness that has installed the British in Egypt. (Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: I think I have changed my mind. I won't call on the other Easterner. The time is up, except that I have told Sir Willoughby or General Hoskins that I would be glad if either of them would care to close the discussion, in a very few minutes, and when I do this, I apologize to my other friend from the East and three or four other people whom I would have asked to speak if we had had time.

(There were calls from the audience to hear the Easterner.)

The other Easterner that I was going to call on is an old friend of ours, Mufty-Zade K. Zia Bey, a Turk who has spoken for us before (Applause.)

MUFTY-ZADE K. ZIA BEY: I don't want to take even two minutes of your valuable time. I am glad, however, of this opportunity to say a few words, because I wouldn't want to leave this meeting with the impression that the majority of the Turks, or even any amount of Turks that really would count, would ask or desire any control either by Britain or Japan. There might have been, undoubtedly there were some people who expressed that opinion to Mr. Morgenthau, but unfortunately there might be traitors in any country, so those were counted amongst them. The fact that the majority of Turks did not want any such control has been best answered, I think, on the plains of Anatolia.

I want also just to put a question into your minds that I would like you to study and give it an answer by yourselves. When we hear about the white man's burden, if we think of the situation, prosperity, education, art, knowledge of science and so forth, of the East long before the Westerners considered their burden to help the East, we probably would start to wonder if really the Western man, the white man, has a burden, or is a burden. (Laughter.)

THE CHAIRMAN: As a Westerner, I am almost glad there aren't any more of these Easterners around. General Hoskins will close the discussion in three or four minutes.

GENERAL HOSKINS: I shan't take up any time, ladies and gentlemen. We have learned something from every speaker. From many of them I have learned a great deal, things that we all should know, what are in other people's minds and they have been frank enough (laughter), but what I would say, just by way of closing is, let us beware of theorizing. Remember the man that has to do the job practically. Let us beware of words like imperialism. There is good imperialism and there is bad. All those sort of catch words and catch phrases can trip us up; we have to get down really further than that sort of thing. I believe that out of this is going to come in Egypt a moderate party, and that is the great hope, and if that moderate party of nationalists comes, we shall very soon arrive at a conclusion with them which will be the beginning of England getting out of Egypt. As for the Sudan, we didn't hear much about the self-determination of the Sudanese. Just picture it and remember the Arabs would get the better of the Sudanese at once. We should go back to the slave trade. Does America want that? (Applause.)

[THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 4 O'CLOCK]

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN



From "Egypt, The Sudan and The Nile", by Judge Pierre Crabites, in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, December 15, 1924.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with an area in round numbers of 950,000 square miles, is approximately as large as the United States east of the Mississippi river. It equals the combined areas of France, the British Isles, Italy, Spain, Norway and Germany.

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